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The aim of the paper is to identify the impact of the Western Balkans Diaspora 
on economic development of these countries, in particular Kosovo. Through qualitative 
methodological approaches the paper will review and analyze the definition and 
concept of migration, the reasons and factors of migration, migrations theories, the 
main destination for migrants, specifications of Kosovo population migration into 
years, the migration phases of the Kosovo population, the effects of migration or 
remittances on economic development of Kosovo, effective policies to strengthen the 
link between diaspora and development, remittance transfer channels and so on. From 
all the Western Balkan countries, Kosovo continues to be a significant trend for 
emigration because labour market is unable to absorb the high number of job seekers. 
Hence, the Kosovo institutions should promote investment and inform the Kosovo 
diaspora of facilities for doing business, and reforms that have been implemented in 
Kosovo. The limitations of this research may be the insufficient data and statistics on 
migration trends of the Western Balkan countries. Therefore, it was not possible to 
incorporate econometric analysis. The value of this paper, lies in dealing with Western 
Balkan migration problem, a problem that has been little addressed in the current 
academic literature. 
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The official definition provided by international institutions identifies 
migration or an international migrant as any person who changes his or her country of 
usual residence for a minimum period of time. In particular, a “long-term migrant” is a 
person who does this “for a period of at least 1 year, so that the country of destination 
effectively becomes his or her new country of residence”. A “short-term migrant” is a 
person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period 
of at least three months but less than one year, except in cases where the movement to 
that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, 
business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2017). 
Three factors determine the rate of population growth of a country:  Birth rate, 
death rate and rate of migration (emigration and immigration). The rate of migration is 
the most difficult to measure as so much depends on the reliability of the information 
obtained from different countries (Robinson, 1977). Migration as a process is not a 
phenomenon that has arisen in the present day, the roots of migration are very remote. 
People have migrated for certain political, social, economic, cultural, educational 
reasons. While there is broad consensus that the volume, diversity, geographical scope 
and overall complexity of migration have increased under the influence of broader 
globalization processes, these assumptions have not been subjected to systematic 
empirical assessment (Czaika and Haas, 2015). 
Immigrants move more easily, send remittances to their countries, becoming a 
factor for many developing countries for their growth. Studies have shown that 
remittances can reduce the depth and severity of poverty in developing countries and 
that they are associated with increased household spending on health, education and 
SMEs. However, there’s little evidence that they have much impact on overall 
economic growth in receiving countries (Pew Research Center, 2018). Castelli (2018) 
emphasizes that migration is always the result of a complex combination of macro, 
meso and micro factors, the former acting at the society level and the latter acting at the 
family or even individual level. The prevalence of a factor over the other is 
unpredictable. The origin of migration is not only globalization but also other factors: 
Political decisions such as the wars in Iraq and Syria, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (Oil), the facilitation of migration policies. 
A migrant can be defined as a person who changes their country of residence. 
More precisely a migrant can be someone whose country of birth is different to their 
country of residence or someone who changes their country of usual residence for a 
period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes the 
country of usual residence (Sturge, 2019).  The reasons of migration may also be ‘push’ 
or ‘pull’ factors. Push factors are those that force the individual to move voluntarily. 
Push factors may include pcverty/lcw wages, high unemployment, overpopulation, high 
taxes, corruption, discriminatory, etc. Pull factors are those factors in the destination 
country that attract the individual to leave their home. Those factors are high wages, 
demand for labor, strong economic growth, low cost of living, good health care and 
137
POSLOVNA IZVRSNOST ZAGREB, GOD. XIV (2020) BR. 1          Jusufi G., Ukaj M.: Migration and econimic development in western Balkan countries: Evidence...
 
education systems, ect (Simpson, 2017). From the figure 1, it can be understood that 
migrants can be “pushed” out of their home countries due to poverty/low wages, high 
unemployment, poor health care or corruption. As result of these factors, migrants are 
often “pulled” into destinations that offer high wages, good health care and education 
systems, generous welfare benefits, law and order, or low cost of living. 
 
Figure 1. Push and pull factors of migration 
 
Source: Simpson, 2017 
 
Natives in developed countries see immigration as a source of adverse 
economic effects, not as a stimulus for greater competitiveness. This is especially for 
immigration flows from developing countries. But when supported by appropriate 
policies, migration can contribute to economic growth in the country of origin and the 
host country. The main destination for migrants are developed countries for many 
attractive and motivating reasons. The US remains the country with the largest number 
of immigrants in the world. Destination countries also benefit greatly from migration, 
filling the labor market gap, reducing the cost of workers for many enterprises by 
exploiting migrants. The number of international migrations, including also refugees, 
increased in 258,000,000 in 2017, by 172,000,000 as was in 2010. Part of international 
immigrants in the world wide population increased by 3,4%, as per 2,8%, as it was in 
the same time period. ¾ of the increased migration in period of 2000-2017 was for the 
countries with the maximum incomes, where the part of international migrants, 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Critical summary of migration 
There are numerous studies that analyze migration. Some of these studies 
present this phenomenon in a positive light while some others present it in a negative 
light. Migration solves social problems by alleviating unemployment, alleviating 
poverty, providing economic support, professional capacity building or quality 
enhancement obtained from developed countries. Immigration plays an important role 
in the transfer of capital investment and accelerates the exposure of traditional 
communities to liberal, rational, democratic ideas and modern knowledge. Getting 
higher salaries into host countries means that marginal production in these countries is 
higher than in the country of origin, this affects the relocation of people to these 
countries leading to an increase in global output worldwide (Bellaqa and Jusufi 2020).   
 The negative effects of migration include the cost to developing countries of 
losing labor and human capital to foreign labor markets, especially the “brain drain” 
(Taylor, 2006). According to Castles (2007) the social and economic costs of 
emigration can be high: The countries draw attention to the distress caused by long-term 
separation of families, the distortion of education systems re-shaped to meet the needs 
of destination countries, etc. Overall, emigration of labour whether skilled or less skilled 
can lead to serious loss of potential growth for the country of emigration. Telli (2014) 
examines the relationship between economic development in less-developed migrant-
sending countries and migrant flows from those countries to the developed 
countries. The study is motivated by the misconception that there is a linear relationship 
between the level of economic development and emigration from developing countries. 
Through panel data, the study finds that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between economic development and emigration from developing countries to the 
developed countries, though this relationship is sensitive to aggregation of countries. 
 Some developed countries have a shortage of workers to fill positions in 
various sectors of their economies, or their working age population is steadily ageing 
without adequate replacement levels. These factors are the most important factors that 
influence migrations: demographic change, socioeconomic and political crises, and 
widening wage gaps between developed and developing countries (UNDP, 2009). Two 
types of economic differences encourage migration: Inequality between countries and 
inequality within a country. The world’s nation-states have per capita incomes that 
range from less than $250 per person per year to more than $50,000, a difference that 
provides a significant incentive for people, especially young adults, to migrate for 
higher wages and more opportunities. Uneven geographic distribution in the growth of 
the world’s labor force is another dimension of economic inequality between nation-
states that adds to migration pressures. All labor force growth is projected to be in the 
lower-income countries: The work force in these countries is projected to increase by 
about 425 million between 2005 and 2015, while the labor force in higher-income 
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2.2 Theories of migration 
Motives to migrate are complex. So, different migration theories should be 
viewed as complementary rather than contradictory (Andersson and Karpestam, 
2018). In addition to the difficulties that all the social sciences experience when trying 
to explain human behaviour, migration theories face special ones: its subject matter is 
hard to define, difficult to measure, extremely multifaceted and multiform, and thus 
resistant to theory-building. While the reservoir of theories, and especially of conceptual 
frameworks, available nowadays represents a clear improvement over the situation a 
few decades ago, their contribution to our knowledge of migration is still limited 
(Arango, 2000). 
 The dominant theory in explaining causes of migration is the neoclassical 
theory with its underlying assumption that migration is stimulated primarily by rational 
economic considerations of relative benefits and costs, mostly financial but also 
psychological. The central argument of this theory concentrates on wages. Under the 
assumption of full employment, it predicts a linear relationship between wage 
differentials and migration flows. The neoclassical macro-level elaboration can be 
transferred to the micro-level model of individual choice and has been termed the 
human capital theory of migration. This theory enriches the neoclassical framework by 
incorporating the socio-demographic characteristics of the individual as an important 
determinant of migration at the micro-level (Kurekova, 2011). 
 The network theory does not look at the determinants which initiate migration 
but rather at what perpetuates migration in time and space. Haug (2008) studied the role 
of social networks in terms of location-specific social capital. It discusses relations 
between sociological and economic aspects of migration and outlines the influence of 
social capital on migration decision-making and chain migration processes. Social 
capital at the place of destination has positive impacts on emigration intentions and 
return migration, whereas social capital at the place of residence has negative impacts 
on return migration. Both neoclassical and the new economic theory conceptualize 
migration decisions as the outcome of rational economic calculations by individuals or 
families responding to objective market forces or constraints. Segmented labour market 
theory of migration takes a different perspective, where immigration responds to 
demand driven forces within structural imbalances of advanced economies.  Capitalism 
gives rise to segmented labour markets where a primary market which generates high 
paying secure jobs coexists side by side with secondary market that is typically 
generating insecure, low paying jobs, and hazardous and unpleasant working conditions. 
Immigrants become desirable and are sought to fill jobs in the secondary market where 
residents shun away from certain occupations (Kubursi, 2005). 
 In Table 1, the main migration theories are presented. Initially all theories were 
classified into two groups based on the subject of analysis. The first group subject to 
analysis has the determinants of migration, while the second group has the perpetuation 
of migration. Then the theories are classified according to the level of analysis. Some 
theories have analyzed migration or its effects at the micro level, while others at the 
macro level. Meanwhile, the table also presents the variables that have been used in 
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each theory to investigate the problem of migration. Finally, the main criticisms or 
shortcomings of these migration theories are presented. 
 
Table 1. Overview of theories of migration 
Theory Subject of analysis 
Level of 












migration determinants – 
exclusion of politics and 
policies.  
Assumes linearity – unable to 
explain differential migration, 
why people do not move, or 
why migration ceases before 
wage differentials equalize. 
Ignores market imperfections. 













Overly optimistic view - 
migration is not always a 


















Critique of the neoclassical 
theory rather than a theory in 
its own right. 
Sending side bias. 
Limited applicability – 
difficult to isolate the effect 
of market imperfections and 
risk in migration decisions 














induced by the 
flow of capital 
Only applicable at the global 
level. 
Explanation formulated ex 
ante, cannot be empirically 
tested. 
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Receiving state bias – 
excludes push factors, formal 
recruitment. 
Practices overemphasized. 
Unable to account for 
differential immigration rates 
in different advanced 
economies with similar 
economic structures. 
Distinction between primary 
and secondary sector is 
usually arbitrary which leads 






Conceptual framework rather 
than a theory. 
Networks can be 
exclusionary and undermine 





Purely descriptive.  
Unable to account for decline 













Novelty of the concepts has 
been questioned. 
Research within this 
paradigm usually selects on 
dependent variable. 
Source: Kurekova, 2011 
 
System Theory emphasizes migration from peripheral developing countries to 
core capitalist ones. Migrants flow from the periphery to the core while capital, 
machinery, and goods flow from the core to the periphery. This often creates a loop: 
capital and machinery, for instance, may increase agricultural productivity, forcing 
people to move internally to cities and cause high youth unemployment in urban areas. 
These youths may end up migrating to more advanced economies (European 
Commission, 2018).  
 The political economy model explicitly focuses on the political mechanisms 
generating transnational population flows. This approach views receiver- country or 
region (for example, the European Union as a supranational body) immigration policies, 
including regulations of entry, duration of sojourn, permission to work, the treatment of 
unauthorized immigrants, and of citizenship as directly shaping the volume and 
directions of international migration. Advocates of the political economy approach 
forcefully argue for the recognition of the importance of the realm of political decisions 
as a causal force in shaping international population flows (Morawska, 2007).  
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3. MIGRATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 
 
The Western Balkans is a geopolitical term coined by the governing bodies of 
the EU in the early 2000s and referring to those countries in Southeastern Europe that 
were not EU members or candidates at the time but could aspire to join the bloc. The 
Western Balkan consisted of six countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia (Dabrowski and Myachenkova, 2018). This 
region has a lot of economic and human potential, and yet is not often considered by 
companies and entrepreneurs from other parts of the world (Jusufi and Lubeniqi, 2019). 
According to Baković (2010) companies from transition economies need to be aware 
that internal capabilities such as innovation-oriented culture, entrepreneurship and 
market orientation are among important drivers of wealth creation and growth. 
Currently, about 4.5 million people from the Western Balkans are living 
outside their country of origin and still maintain close ties to these countries. Through 
knowledge and technology transfer, investments and other financial contributions, the 
mobilization of networks and contacts, these migrants are able to promote innovation 
and development processes in their countries of origin (GIZ and CIM, 2014). Table 2 
shows the population trends, migration, unemployment and poverty rates of the Western 
Balkan countries.	 As can be seen from this table, all countries in this region are 
experiencing a demographic decline due to higher emigration and lower birth rates. 
These statistics show that demographic movements in these countries do not have 
positive growth dynamics. 
 















Albania 0.31 -3.3 32.9 14 14.3 
B&H -0.16 -0.4 42.1 20.5 17.2 
Kosovo - - 29.1 34.8 30 
North 
Macedonia 0.17 -0.5 37.9 23.4 21.5 
Montenegro -0.2 - 40.7 17.1 8.6 
Serbia -0.46 0 42.6 16 8.9 
Source: Šelo Šabić, 2018 
 
Also it should be emphasized that few parts of Europe are more marked by 
emigration than the Western Balkans. The population of this region has grown smaller 
and older over the last few decades. But even though many people have left, data about 
them remain sparse. The region is yet to fully grasp just how beneficial its diaspora 
could be for its future and even if it wanted to, it would quickly come up against a lack 
of hard evidence on which to base new policy decisions. The current expected average 
Western Balkans GDP growth rate of around 3% is insufficient to accelerate the process 
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of catching up with other European countries. GDP is projected to have risen to 3.2% in 
2018 and to rise by 3.5% in 2019, but if this growth rate continues, it would take six 
decades for the average per capita Western Balkan income to converge with the EU 
average (Vračić, 2019). From Table 3 it can be understood that personal remittances 
play an important economic and social role in all Western Balkan countries, except 
North Macedonia. In Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo their share of GDP exceeds 
10% while in Serbia, Albania and Montenegro they amount less than 10%. 
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This region has had a bad and difficult past. For the past two decades most 
countries in this region have been occupied with addressing the consequences of the 
1991-1995 conflicts, including the large-scale intraregional displacement. Migration has 
been defined primarily by outflows of Western Balkan nationals. Long-simmering 
political, ideological, economic and ethnic tensions among the nations of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia erupted when Slovenia and Croatia declared 
independence in 1991 and further intensified with the secession of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1992.  
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 3.5 million individuals left the region. 
Hence, the emigration rate has been at 19.4%, and ranging from 9.1% in Serbia to 
38.5% in Albania. As a consequence, remittance flows have been sizable: The entire 
region received 8.6 billion USD in 2015, ranging from 3.1% of GDP in North 
Macedonia to 16.7% in Kosovo. These figures still considerably exceed the inflows 
from foreign direct investment and official development assistance, 5 and 2.4 billion 
USD, respectively, hence reflecting the massive dependence of region’s economies on 
the money the diaspora sends back (Petreski et al, 2017). 
Economic stagnation and unemployment have triggered waves of labour 
migration. Many labour migrants could rely on the support provided by large diaspora 
communities established abroad over decades of outmigration and refugee movements. 
The presence of well-established diasporas, along with other factors, such as availability 
of job opportunities and comparably higher wages, have made Western Europe (mainly 
Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland) an attractive destination for labour migrants 
from the Western Balkans. Greece and Italy also emerged as important countries of 
destination, especially for seasonal labour migration from Albania (Zitnanova, 2014). 
According to Mustafa-Topxhiu and Xhelili-Krasniqi (2017) diaspora has a 
positive effect on economic development of the region. Their study utilizes a strongly 
balanced panel data over the 2005-2015 period for the six Western Balkan countries 
using the ordinary Least Squares Method, the Pooled Regression Model to evaluate the 
parameters. According to the results, remittances have a positive impact on economic 
growth and can foster economic growth in the Western Balkan. Also, they find a 
statistically significant positive relationship between economic growth and other 
variables such as exports, capital formation and labor. 
It is characteristic that individuals from the Western Balkan are closer to the individuals 
from developed countries (in terms of value) than the social systems in this region are to 
those in developed countries. This disparity is another generator of the increased 
migration flow from this region to developed countries. The mentioned reason, 
combined with the state of the rule of law, adherence to laws, corruption perception, 
extent of discrimination based on sexual orientation, freedom of speech, as well as the 
perception of the outlook of this region create a broad range of push factors which 
become more intense in certain time periods (WFD et al., 2019). In short, the problem 
of migration is widely expressed in this region. 
In Western Balkans, the problem with migration is that although it raises 
aggregate incomes, it does tend to reduce, other things being equal, the wages of some 
of the receiving country’s workers. One can take for granted that migration raises the 
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using the ordinary Least Squares Method, the Pooled Regression Model to evaluate the 
parameters. According to the results, remittances have a positive impact on economic 
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variables such as exports, capital formation and labor. 
It is characteristic that individuals from the Western Balkan are closer to the individuals 
from developed countries (in terms of value) than the social systems in this region are to 
those in developed countries. This disparity is another generator of the increased 
migration flow from this region to developed countries. The mentioned reason, 
combined with the state of the rule of law, adherence to laws, corruption perception, 
extent of discrimination based on sexual orientation, freedom of speech, as well as the 
perception of the outlook of this region create a broad range of push factors which 
become more intense in certain time periods (WFD et al., 2019). In short, the problem 
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incomes of the migrants otherwise they would not choose to migrate. Migration also 
raises the return to capital, hence profits, in the receiving country. But the increase in 
the receiving country’s labour pool might reduce the wages of incumbent workers in 
certain industries. The net result is an increase in the receiving country’s aggregate 
income and an expansion in its tax base. From this overall gain, governments could 
compensate the domestic workers who see their incomes fall and still leave everybody 
better off (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005).  
Krasniqi and Williams (2019) demonstrate that the entrepreneurial intentions 
of returning diaspora are affected by their level of trust and perceptions of risk in 
institutions at home. Through a survey of diaspora returning to Kosovo, their research 
finds that business experience has a negative relationship on probability to return, but it 
has a positive relationship on entrepreneurial intentions. However, those with 
professional and qualified jobs are more likely to have intentions to return, but less 
likely to have entrepreneurial intentions.  
 
 
4. KOSOVO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FLOWS   
 
Population in Kosovo in 2018 is estimated to be 1,795,666 residents. 
Albanians make up 88%, Serbs 7% and other communities 5% of the total population. 
More than 35% of the population is young (KAS, 2019). Kosovo is one of Europe's 
poorest countries with about 40% of the population living below the poverty line, and 
has one of the highest unemployment rates in Southeast Europe. In Kosovo, the 
unemployment rate measures the number of people actively looking for a job as a 
percentage of the labour force. Unemployment rate in Kosovo decreased to 25.30 % in 
the second quarter of 2019 from 26.90 % in the first quarter of 2019. Unemployment 
rate averaged 35.39% from 2001 until 2019, reaching an all-time high of 57 % in the 
fourth quarter of 2001 and a record low of 25.30 % in the second quarter of 2019 
(Trading Economics, 2019). Given the poor prospects of employment, individually 
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Figure 2. Population with citizenship of Kosovo  
 
Source: Möllers et al, 2017 
 
Over 35% of total Kosovo’s population had emigrated to Germany, followed 
by Switzerland with around 23%, and Italy over 7%. Other countries, including Canada 
and Australia, comprised of over 10% of the Kosovan migrant population (KAS, 2014). 
According to Kotorri (2010) the probability of emigration from households in Kosovo is 
found to be influenced by relative wealth, type of area and regional unemployment 
rates. Kosovo has historically faced several waves of migration, whether for economic, 
political or social reasons. Table 4 shows the percentage of immigrants from Kosovo for 
each stage or phase of emigration. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Kosovar emigrants by stages of emigration 
The wave of emigration % of immigrants 
Phase I 7.1% 
Phase II 32.9% 
Phase III 7.9% 
Phase IV 52.1% 
Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2013 
 
The periods of migration can be divided into four stages; 
Phase I (1960-1988): Emigration was initially as seasonal workers. The first 
period deals with the temporary migration of workers to Switzerland and Germany. 
These migrant workers have been from rural areas of Kosovo with a low education and 
they have had special employment contracts. In 1981 there were about 27,000 emigrants 
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migration continued after 1989 after the breakup of Yugoslavia for economic reasons 
(Hoti, 2015). 
Phase II (1989-1997): The 1990’s wave dominated by better-educated, skilled 
and better off Kosovar Albanians from urban areas, who emigrated primarily to avoid 
military service in the Yugoslav army during the wars in Yugoslavia, was primarily 
concerned with their own education and far less on remitting (Gashi and Haxhikadrija, 
2012). Remittances have made some very distinct contributions during this phase. It 
was the diaspora that paid for the parallel education and health structures during the 
1990s, responding to a call from the ‘government in exile’ when a large number of 
intellectuals were dismissed from their jobs and education in Albanian was banned. The 
diaspora is said to have sponsored the Kosovo Liberation Army and made a very 
important contribution to the reconstruction of Kosovo after the conflict (Vathi and 
Black, 2007).  
Phase III (1998-1999): The next phase occurred in 1998 during the outbreak of 
the war in Kosovo, which led to a phase of mass emigration to Europe and other 
countries. Between March and June 1999, an estimated 850,000 refugees fled into 
neighbouring Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro, threatening wider regional 
instability. Some 200,000 people were internally displaced or homeless inside Kosovo 
itself (Gollopeni, 2016).  
Phase IV (2000-2015): At this stage migrants moved westward for family 
reunification. Also they migrated for economic reasons. In recent years, economic 
growth has brought about 4%, and this growth has been driven by public and private 
investments, which do not bring about any improvement in labor market conditions 
(European Stability Initiative, 2015). 
 
 
5. THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
OF KOSOVO 
 
Migration and remittances have been of considerable importance to the 
economy and households of Kosovo since the late 1960s and continue to be so even 
today. Its importance is reflected both at micro (household) as well as macro level 
(GLPS, 2017). Despite the negative effects it has on population decline, migration 
contributes to stabilizing employment, in particular reducing the unemployment rate. 
Each year migration absorbs approximately one in two young individuals in the labor 
market. Therefore, migration plays an important role in reducing the unemployment 
rate. Immigrant households participate less in the labor market than households without 
them.  Returning migrants will continue to bring to Kosovo experience and knowledge 
obtained abroad, as evidenced by their improved education.  
 During their stay abroad, migrants continue to have economic, cultural, and 
political relationships with their home country. The main economic activities are 
remitting money, consuming home country products, investing in the home country 
(mostly in housing construction), and engaging in philanthropy there. The economic 
strength of the emigrant determines both the size of these activities and the policies that 
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the government creates to facilitate transactions and the investment climate. The return 
of migrants depends on economic, political, and social circumstances in the home 
country. When migrants decide to return, they often bring savings, how they use these 
savings depends on a number of policies, such as ease of doing business and availability 
of information about investment opportunities. Moreover, migrants can bring new skills 
and knowledge that can build up the human capital of the home country.  
 Kosovo needs to establish an institutional framework to realize its vision of 
how migration will contribute to Kosovo‘s development. The choice of institutional 
alternative will depend on the domestic context, including funding constraints, but in 
any case institutional capacity needs to be considerably reinforced. Remittances are the 
largest source of Kosovo‘s external funding, measures to facilitate their transfer and 
reduce costs should be a priority. The authorities should therefore direct their attention 
to promoting competition for transfers and enhancing the financial literacy of remittance 
senders and recipients.  
 Migration has reached an important dimension everywhere in the world. 
Immigrant remittances to developing countries reached large sums of dollars. Therefore, 
developing countries should use these financial flows for economic and social 
development. From international experience Kosovan authorities can learn more about 
how migration and development intersect and how policy choices can influence these 
linkages to the benefit of economic development. Increasing GDP for many developing 
countries can lead to an increase in immigration rather than a decrease. Increasing 
income can create a good base for financing the migration of many social strata and one 
of them would be those with high human capital that could be considered brain drain.  
The type of migration that Kosovo has experienced cannot be considered a brain drain 
because 92 % of migrants have no more than secondary education, only 5 % had a 
bachelor‘s degree when they left Kosovo (World Bank, 2011). 
 
 
6. THE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON KOSOVO ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Kosovar diaspora is spread all over the world. Kosovo’s Remittances data 
was reported at 220.709 Euro in June 2019. This records an increase from the previous 
number of 184.659 Euro for March 2019. The data reached an all-time high of 220.709 
Euro in June 2019 and a record low of 108.742 Euro in March 2012 (CEIC, 2019). 
Money sent from the Diaspora represents the most important financial source for the 
people of Kosovo. For many transition and developing countries, external funding is 
very important. Especially for Kosovo which should identify its comparative 
advantages, increase the competition capabilities of local firms, improve the business 
environment and use EU financial assistance more effectively to compete regionally and 
in the EU market (Qorraj and Jusufi, 2018). 
Kosovo is considered to be one of the largest in the diaspora in proportion to 
the total number of citizens within the country. Countries leading the remittances also 
include economically developed countries where Germany leads with 34%, Switzerland 
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the total number of citizens within the country. Countries leading the remittances also 
include economically developed countries where Germany leads with 34%, Switzerland 
Poslovna izvrsnost B5 01-2020.indd   149 16/06/2020   07:31
150
POSLOVNA IZVRSNOST ZAGREB, GOD. XIV (2020) BR. 1          Jusufi G., Ukaj M.: Migration and econimic development in western Balkan countries: Evidence...
 
with 23% and Italy with 7% (Germin & DANIDA and SDC, 2018). Based on statistics 
on the Kosovar population living in the diaspora, it turns out that around 700,000-
800,000 people who were born in Kosovo currently live abroad. Remittances as a 
source of financing for Kosovo continue to be above the level of FDI due to the large 
Kosovo Diaspora and the unfavorable climate for foreign investment which was not 
satisfactory at this time. Various studies suggest that migration results in a significant 
increase in global welfare; developed countries can increase global welfare by opening 
the door for more immigrants (Bellaqa and Bajrami, 2019). Table 5 presents remittance 
transfer channels, by gender of emigrant. As can be seen, remittance transfers in 
Kosovo are mostly made through friends or emigrants. This is the preferred channel for 
Kosovar emigrants to transfer remittances. 
 
Table 5. Remittance transfer channels, by gender of emigrant 
Transfer channel Women Men 
Bank transfer 29.0% 40.5% 
Credit/debit card - 1.2% 
Money transfer agency 13.9% 16.9% 
Post office - 0.9% 
In-person (by emigrant or friend) 57.2% 40.5% 
Source: UNDP, 2012 
 
Remittances in Kosovo have a very high share in the economic development of 
GDP. Remittances account for a total of 20.64 % of GDP. After Kosovo is ranked 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with about 11%, and Albania with 10.8 %, while Greece’s 
lowest share with 0.35 %. Particular importance is given to Kosovo, which has as a 
result that the percentage of remittance participation has a high positive correlation with 
the percentage of participation in Serbia, whereas the high negative correlaction with 
Montenegro’s. In general, in most of the Balkan countries, remittances and their trend 
are projected to decrease, and according to the trend application, we can see that 
remittances in Kosovo tend to increase (Jashari and Geci, 2018). From Table 6 it can be 
understood that the share of remittances in Kosovo's GDP during the eight-year period 
2008-2016 was about 10-15%. 
 
Table 6. Remittance to GDP ratio (in million Euros) 
Year Remittances GDP % that remittances occupy on GDP 
2008 609 3,883 15.68 % 
2009 586 4,070 14.40 % 
2010 584 4,402 13.27 % 
2011 493 4,815 10.24 % 
2012 516 5,059 10.20 % 
2013 573 5,327 10.76 % 
2014 622 5,567 11.17 % 
2015 665 5,807 11.45 % 
2016 691 6,070 11.38 % 
Source: Prekazi, 2018 
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Investments from the Diaspora are very welcome for the economy of Kosovo, 
they should be increased due to their great role in improving the economic situation in 
the country. Approximately 10% of total investment in the privatization process is a 
contribution of diaspora to privatization. The diaspora's entrepreneurial activity is still at 
modest levels. Approximately 4% of them have businesses operating in countries where 
they live or in Kosovo. Remittances and migration will not lead to sustained economic 
growth over the medium to long term. Proper public policies, the rule of law are vital to 
improving the climate for doing business and investing from the outside, laying the 
foundations for sustainable growth (UNDP, 2014). 
Some empirical studies show that remittances can have a positive effect on a 
country's economic growth. Another set of studies also confirms the great positive 
impact of remittances on both bank deposit and private sector credit banks. By 
stimulating investment and consumption, remittances can have the potential to reduce 
the recession in developing countries as well as boost the local economy. Remittances 
increase domestic savings and improve financial intermediation, which in return can 
improve the country of origin perspective. For countries facing transition during the 
1990s remittances had a positive effect on aggregate production through investment and 
entrepreneurial activities. Remittances enable the economy to spend more than it 
produces, then "Dutch Disease" and greater migration can be encouraged that will 
increase the dependence on these financing flows (Hoti, 2015).  
There are doubts as to whether the Diaspora will continue to contribute the 
same level of remittances to their families and relatives living in Kosovo in the future. 
The results of the research suggest that the diaspora's willingness to help Kosovo is not 
as great as it was in the pre-war period, but remittances will continue even though they 
will be to a lesser extent. Sustainable income growth for population in the long run 
cannot be based on remittances alone which are large and resilient to shocks, but 
unlikely to increase much more. While many Kosovans continue to emigrate and 
thereby expand their life choices, the high rates of unemployment and enforced 
economic inactivity demonstrate that emigration is not a solution for everyone. Potential 
investors include migrants and recipients of remittances who may have funds to invest 
but currently face numerous uncertainties. Institutions and the private sector should 
consider how to use the Kosovo Diaspora on one hand for access to international 
markets, and on the other hand as ambassadors for Kosovo products and exports of 
services through activities such as international fairs, cultural events and by creation of 
Associations with Diaspora Businesses. Remittances, will not lead to sustainable 
economic growth and human development in the medium to long run (UNDP 2014). 
Migrants from Kosovo that have businesses in the host countries are more 
likely to return suggesting the need for policies aiming at improving the business 
environment and business investment promotion policies to encourage migrants to 
return and invest utilizing their financial and human capital, and business networks. 
Such policies should focus on maintaining cooperation among the Kosovo government, 
Kosovo-based business associations and migrant host-country based business 
associations in identifying investment opportunities, and the need for customized 
support in establishing businesses and other relevant government support instruments. 
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the door for more immigrants (Bellaqa and Bajrami, 2019). Table 5 presents remittance 
transfer channels, by gender of emigrant. As can be seen, remittance transfers in 
Kosovo are mostly made through friends or emigrants. This is the preferred channel for 
Kosovar emigrants to transfer remittances. 
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Investments from the Diaspora are very welcome for the economy of Kosovo, 
they should be increased due to their great role in improving the economic situation in 
the country. Approximately 10% of total investment in the privatization process is a 
contribution of diaspora to privatization. The diaspora's entrepreneurial activity is still at 
modest levels. Approximately 4% of them have businesses operating in countries where 
they live or in Kosovo. Remittances and migration will not lead to sustained economic 
growth over the medium to long term. Proper public policies, the rule of law are vital to 
improving the climate for doing business and investing from the outside, laying the 
foundations for sustainable growth (UNDP, 2014). 
Some empirical studies show that remittances can have a positive effect on a 
country's economic growth. Another set of studies also confirms the great positive 
impact of remittances on both bank deposit and private sector credit banks. By 
stimulating investment and consumption, remittances can have the potential to reduce 
the recession in developing countries as well as boost the local economy. Remittances 
increase domestic savings and improve financial intermediation, which in return can 
improve the country of origin perspective. For countries facing transition during the 
1990s remittances had a positive effect on aggregate production through investment and 
entrepreneurial activities. Remittances enable the economy to spend more than it 
produces, then "Dutch Disease" and greater migration can be encouraged that will 
increase the dependence on these financing flows (Hoti, 2015).  
There are doubts as to whether the Diaspora will continue to contribute the 
same level of remittances to their families and relatives living in Kosovo in the future. 
The results of the research suggest that the diaspora's willingness to help Kosovo is not 
as great as it was in the pre-war period, but remittances will continue even though they 
will be to a lesser extent. Sustainable income growth for population in the long run 
cannot be based on remittances alone which are large and resilient to shocks, but 
unlikely to increase much more. While many Kosovans continue to emigrate and 
thereby expand their life choices, the high rates of unemployment and enforced 
economic inactivity demonstrate that emigration is not a solution for everyone. Potential 
investors include migrants and recipients of remittances who may have funds to invest 
but currently face numerous uncertainties. Institutions and the private sector should 
consider how to use the Kosovo Diaspora on one hand for access to international 
markets, and on the other hand as ambassadors for Kosovo products and exports of 
services through activities such as international fairs, cultural events and by creation of 
Associations with Diaspora Businesses. Remittances, will not lead to sustainable 
economic growth and human development in the medium to long run (UNDP 2014). 
Migrants from Kosovo that have businesses in the host countries are more 
likely to return suggesting the need for policies aiming at improving the business 
environment and business investment promotion policies to encourage migrants to 
return and invest utilizing their financial and human capital, and business networks. 
Such policies should focus on maintaining cooperation among the Kosovo government, 
Kosovo-based business associations and migrant host-country based business 
associations in identifying investment opportunities, and the need for customized 
support in establishing businesses and other relevant government support instruments. 
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The Kosovo government is implementing repatriation programmes with host countries. 
As return migration is more likely among those that have emigrated during the 1998/9 
War and lower-income households, it is recommended that the government continues 





From the data and theories elaborated, it was understood that migration has 
high tendencies from developing countries to developed ones, where well-being is of a 
high standard. Also the economic and social standard is extremely high. In Kosovo 
there have been large movements of the population outside its territory over various 
periods of time. The reasons have been political and socio-economic. During all periods 
of migration, the destination of Kosovars has been Western Europe. This movement of 
people towards western countries will affect the labor market in Kosovo. Some of the 
jobs such as doctor and engineer will be vacated.  
Remittances from the diaspora have had a significant impact on economic 
growth and on improving the welfare of the Kosovo population. Kosovar diaspora 
represented a huge and diplomatic network but the institutions dealing with the diaspora 
lack basic data on demographics and needs of this important diaspora. It can be said that 
the diaspora has played a key role in the positive changes that have taken place in 
Kosovo's recent history. The level of diaspora direct investments in Kosovo remains 
lower than expected. Today, the Kosovar diaspora invests heavily in the real estate 
sector in Kosovo. Remittances are mainly focused on basic consumption. However, the 
remittances should be more economically focused especially on development projects. 
The Kosovo government needs to improve its business environment. Through 
business investment promotion policies, the government should encourage migrants to 
return and invest in Kosovo. Migrants using their financial and human capital will 
contribute to Kosovo's GDP growth. In conclusion, it can be said that the promotion and 
creation of investment incentives for the diaspora, especially in partnership with local 
government, should be the main and important objective of Kosovo institutions that aim 
at economic and social development of Kosovo. No document or strategy of Kosovo 
institutions specifies the measures to be taken regarding migration. Therefore, Kosovo 
institutions need to create special strategies for exploiting the potential of the diaspora 
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MIGRACIJE I EKONOMSKI RAZVOJ U ZEMLJAMA ZAPADNOG 
BALKANA: PRIMJER KOSOVA 
 
 





Cilj rada je identificirati utjecaj dijaspore zapadnog Balkana na gospodarski 
razvoj ovih zemalja, posebno Kosova. Kvalitativnim metodološkim pristupima rad daje 
pregled i analizu definicije i koncepta migracije, razloga i čimbenika migracija, teorija 
migracija, glavnih odredišta migranata, specifikacija migracije stanovništva na Kosovo 
kroz godine, faza migracije stanovništva Kosova, učinaka migracija ili doznaka 
migranata na gospodarski razvoj Kosova, učinkovitih politika za jačanje veze između 
dijaspore i razvoja, kanala prijenosa doznaka migranata i tako dalje. Od svih zemalja 
zapadnog Balkana, Kosovo i dalje pokazuje značajan trend iseljavanja, jer tržište rada 
ne može apsorbirati velik broj tražitelja posla. Stoga bi kosovske institucije trebale 
promicati ulaganja i informirati kosovsku dijasporu o mogućnostima poslovanja i 
reformama koje su provedene na Kosovu. Ograničenja ovog istraživanja mogu biti 
nedovoljni podaci i statistike o migracijskim trendovima zemalja zapadnog Balkana. 
Stoga nije bilo moguće ugraditi ekonometrijsku analizu. Vrijednost ovog rada sastoji se 
u rješavanju migracijskog problema zapadnog Balkana, problema koji je malo riješen u 
trenutnoj akademskoj literaturi. 
Ključne riječi: zapadni Balkan, migracije, razvoj, Kosovo, doznake migranata. 
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Resource management of a particular area is nowadays one of the greatest 
challenges, especially when it comes to more sensitive areas, such as rural areas. 
Human resources, alongside mostly limited natural resources, represent an opportunity 
for rural areas, especially due to the beginning of utilization of considerable EU pre-
accession funds. This paper presents one part of the primary research results on the 
views of project implementors and end-users about the impact of the achieved results of 
IPA CBC Hungary-Croatia 2007-2013 on human resources of the implementing 
institutions and local communities of the observed, mostly rural area. The conclusion of 
this research, that was conducted in 2018, is that the funds invested in an observed area 
had a dual role. First of all, implementing organizations would not have this amount of 
work and number of employees, nor would they establish partnerships with 
organizations from another country, carry out activities or develop the skills, knowledge 
and capabilities of their human resources. Also, the implementation of their project has 
increased the number of contacts and collaborations with organizations at a local level, 
which is a significant resource for the future. On the other hand, the funds have enabled 
users, residents of local communities along the border, to acquire new skills, increase 
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